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INSIDE TRACK 
"In Zimbabwe's land crisis 
the primary causes — 
land allocation, land utilisation, 
demography, race, poverty 
and war — are also its consequences" 
Currently, Zimbabwe is facing a land crisis that is threatening 
the state's very stability. Decades of misapplied state interventions 
in agrarian socio-economics are now being replaced by grassroots 
and often anarchic land solutions. Recent farm invasions by war 
veterans and landless peasants have seen the destruction of property, 
and violence with injurious and fatal effects both to farmers and 
farm-workers. 
Knox Chitiyo looks at the various social and historical factors that 
have contributed to Zimbabwe's land crisis — primarily the history of 
resistance (linked to land) against the previous settler state and the 
issue of war veterans. The flawed agrarian policies imposed by colonial 
governments produced tensions over agro-environmental issues 
between white and black farmers. The degradation of land by drought 
and other human factors in the two decades since Zimbabwe's inde- 
pendence precipitated a situation of national socio-economic decline. 
Issues of land resettlement, allocation and utilisation have until 
recently, often been overlooked, with the current explosive conse- 
quences brought to the fore by the militancy of war veterans. 
Chitiyo offers an insightful overview of this fraught history of land 
struggle, tracing the use of "silent" violence — threats and use of force 
against livestock and the environment — and "loud" violence — 
threats and use of violence against people and their property. Hope- 
fully, this paper will provide new perspectives to the very complex 
issues regarding Zimbabwe's land crisis. 
Roshila Nair 
Editor 





n the past decade, Zimbabwe has been 
simultaneously confronted by two enormous and 
inter-related socio-economic challenges: the land 
question and the issue of war veterans. The land 
question is both a cause and consequence of 
Zimbabwe's struggle for liberation, the Second Chimurenga 
(1966 — 1980). However, it had its origins in the initial anti- 
colonial struggle, the First Chimurenga (1896 — 1897). 
In essence, this paper examines two themes: first, how 
successive colonial governments inherited and imposed 
fundamentally flawed agrarian policies, and how African 
peasants adapted to and resisted these policies. The threat or 
actual use of violence against people or the environment has 
been used both to press for and refuse land claims by both 
the state (even in the post-independence period) and the 
peasants. Although this paper does not purport to be an 
expert analysis of the land crisis (a number of specialist 
works on this subject are available'), examination of the 
land issue is nevertheless essential. 
Establishing consensus on the true nature of the land 
crisis has been difficult; efforts to reach agreement on a 
solution have posed even more problems.2 Zimbabwe's land 
crisis is one in which the primary causes (land allocation, 
land utiisation, demography, race, poverty and war) are 
also its consequences. This paper investigates this history of 
cause and effect, examining violence as both cause and 
consequence of the land crisis. I use the term "silent" 
violence to refer to the threatened or actual use of force 
against livestock and/or the environment,3 and the term 
"loud violence" to refer to the use, or threatened use, of 
violence against people and their property. 
The second major theme of this paper is the link (until 
recently, often overlooked, with explosive consequences) 
between the land crisis and the war veterans' situation in 
Zimbabwe. This link is both explicit and implicit. Many 
impoverished peasants are demobiised war veterans who 
have failed in various agrarian business ventures. Moreover, 
the peasant class and the war veterans have been the present 
government's most powerful voting constituencies. Neither 
can be ignored, and government has had to find ways to 
neutralise or accommodate them. In addition, 
compensation has been an issue common to both groups. 
During the Second Chimurenga, both peasants and present- 
day war veterans (who were guerrifias or refugees during the 
war) were traumatised by the Rhodesian Security Forces 
(RSF), various guerrilla factions and other private armies. 
After the war, the grassroots soldiers and peasants, who had 
borne the brunt of the suffering, received little recompense, 
while the ruling elite enriched its members. Both the 
peasant farmers and the veterans felt that the government 
had failed them, and they insisted on land and/or financial 
compensation as the price for allowing the government to 
remain in power. 
This paper intends to demonstrate two points. The first 
is that "silent" violence will remain a problem for the 
foreseeable future. Impoverished, alienated and landless 
peasants have traditionally opposed state intervention 
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through "silent" violence, a tradition that continues. The 
state, inspite of its rhetorical posturing, has not eliminated 
the root causes of agrarian 
conflict: poverty and landlessness. 
So far, the government has 
tinkered with, rather than solved 
the land problem. If agro- 
environmental security is an 
important element of agrarian 
peace-building, then the state has 
not succeeded in establishing such 
security.4 
Secondly, although the state has 
faltered in dealing with "silent" 
violence, it is arguable that until 
recently, Zimbabwe was an 
example of successful suppression of "loud" violence. 
Zimbabwe has successfully fostered operational demili- 
tarisation and internal peace-building. The creation of the 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) is one example. An 
examination of the land and war veterans' crises shows that 
the state defused these potentially lethal crises via a 
combination of persuasion, coercion, financial compen- 
sation and rhetoric. Until 1999, it seemed to be following a 
"two-track" method of tolerating "silent" violence, while 
dealing with "loud" violence when this was perceived to be 
a threat to state security and survival. 
While the state successfully neutralised "loud" agrarian 
violence prior to 1998, the new millennium has shown the 
extent and limits of state power. 
Zimbabwe's perilous economic 
situation and the defeat suffered by 
the ruling party in the National 
Referendum of February 2000, have 
plunged the nation deeper into 
turmoil. As the government increa- 
singly sloughs off its inclusionary! 
reconciliatory approach and adopts 
the militant "radical chic" persona of 
the liberation group it was twenty 
years ago, the situation has become 
increasingly polarised. The ruling 
party's current "gangster chic" 
rhetoric plays to populist sentiments, but at national expense. 
The state has pushed to extremes Zimbabwe's historical 
tradition of imposing short-term racial and political 
solutions on genuine agrarian problems. The forcible 
occupation of over 800 white commercial farms (at the time 
of writing) by groups of "war veterans" (many of whom are 
clearly unemployed youths, some who were not even born 
at the time of the war'of liberation) is a case in point. This 
militancy has politically expedient benefits for the 
government, but the cost to the nation as whole is 
increasingly unsustainable. 
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In Zimbabwe's land crisis 
the primary causes 
(land allocation, land utilisation, 
demography, race, poverty 
and war) are also its 
consequences 
A ZANU-PF flag hangs on a farm 
gate. The farm was invaded in 
April 2000. 
LAND AND VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE 
1890—1979 
1890— 1929: Land and Racial/Political 
Expediency 
In 1890, the Pioneer column arrived in the land they were to 
call Rhodesia. They numbered 196 Pioneers and 500 police. 
At this time, there were approximately 700 000 Africans, 
mainly Shona and Ndebele speakers, in the territory (Rolin, 
1978). The Pioneers had come to the country in the belief 
that the land contained vast deposits of gold. There was 
hope that Rhodesia would turn out to be another 
Witwatersrand (McGhee, 1978). 
It soon became clear that Rhodesia was no Eldorado. The 
British South African Company (BSAC), which had 
instigated the trek and was desperate for tangible results, 
was pressured by the would-be miners to compensate them 
with large grants of land that the company had no real 
authority to give. By 1893 the BSAC was already settling 
Pioneers on 1 284 hectare "farms" (at the time, they were 
merely large tracts of land) with no obligation to actually 
use the land. The sole obligation was the annual payment of 
£1 "quit rent" per farm.5 The Pioneer farmers were followed 
by the BSAP (police), who were also allocated farms. They 
in turn were followed by civilians, who were given grants of 
2 500 hectares under the Victoria agreement.6 This "land 
grab" brought the settlers into collision with indigenous 
Shona and Ndebele policies and customs. 
Traditionally, land ownership among the Shona was a 
communal process, operating at different levels: familial, 
clan and village. Chiefs were essentially functionaries who 
allocated land in the best interests of their constituency. 
Among the Ndebele, the king and his chiefs had more direct 
power with respect to land allocation and intervention. 
Both peoples also believed that the real landowners were the 
ancestors and that particular lands were sacred. It was this 
clash between indigenous Africans (who regarded land as 
both a cultural and material resource) and the white settlers 
(who took a more expedient view) that would come to 
dominate the history of the country. 
The immediate result was a number of conflicts, 
including the Anglo—Ndebele war of 1893, that led to the 
removal and eventual destruction of the Ndebele 
monarchy.7 This was followed by the first Chimurenga of 
1896 — 1897. Although this war was partly a revolt against 
settler seizure of land, it was primarily a protest against hut 
tax,8 as well as a response to the simultaneous 
environmental calamities of rinderpest, locusts and 
drought. The local people believed that the settlers were 
destroying the balance of nature. During the First 
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War veterans put up a squatter camp on a white-owned farm. More than 600 white-owned farms throughout Zimbabwe 
were invaded in March 2000. 
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Chimurenga, colonial soldiers and police seized rebel crops By 1905, under this new land allocation policy, there were 
and livestock (and thus helped to turn a natural drought about 60 Natives Reserves (NRs), occupying about 22 per 
into a famine). After a ferocious war that lasted 18 months cent of Rhodesia. Nearly half of the African population of 
and claimed 8 000 lives (Ranger, 1967), the local "rebels" 700 000 now lived in Reserves. They had by then lost 
were defeated, and the settlers created a colonial state. In the approximately 16 million hectares to the settlers. By 1920, 
process, they institutionalised the land problem that the Native Reserves constituted an area of 8,7 million 
successive governments were to grapple with and fail to hectares (Rolin, 1978), while the number of settler farms 
resolve. (Company! freehold) reached 2 500, encompassing an 
However, it should be noted that the settlers did not acreage of approximately 15 million hectares (Palmer, 
generate Zimbabwe's land problem. There had been 1977). 
numerous pre-colonial land wars Apart from the racial 
among and between the Shona and - polarisation of land allocation, 
Ndebele. In 1898, the BSAC settlers institPJtiOIlalised land utilisation also produced 
officially sanctioned the use of force Zimbabwe's land problem many clashes. The settlers 
were 
in establishing a racial solution to - - contemptuous of the traditional 
the land issue in its new land policy, during the First Chimurenga.11 and indigenous system of land 
While settler farmers would have but they did not nenerate it rotation cultivation, which they 
improved land tenure, and pros- dubbed "slash and burn' However, 
pective farmers would continue to the traditional farming methods 
get land grants. According to the 1899 Order in Council, were a survivalist methodology appropriate to the 
"the Council shall assign to the natives land sufficient for environment of relatively sparse (pre-colonial) population 
their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and migrations and abundant land. The colonial stereotype of 
suitable for agriculture and pastoral requirement" (Palmer, Africans as destructive farmers endured nevertheless, 
1977). This was a euphemism for the policy of forcibly buttressed by the "environmental apocalypse" scenarios of 
resettling the defeated Africans in "Reserves". H.E. Alvord, who, in the 1920s predicted disaster if 
traditional African land usage methods 
continued.9 This stereotyping ignored 
the fact that colonial deep ploughing 
methods were actually more destructive 
to the soil than "traditional" methods. 
The government adopted Alvord's 
recommendations on "centralisation" as a 
means of soil and environmental 
conservation. This involved "centralising" 
cultivated lands into large squares and 
setting aside other land squares for 
commercial grazing during the planting! 
growing season. After harvest, cattle were 
allowed to clean-up crop residues and 
uneaten herbiage in and around 
cultivated land. The grazing lands were 
then rested. Simultaneously, African 
"demonstrators" were being trained at 
Domboshava and Tjolotjo to teach better 
farming methods to peasant farmers. In 
later years, these agricultural demon- 
strators were to come into conflict with 
the peasants. 
The racial bias of state-imposed land 
allocation! utiisation policies was one 
source of conflict. Another was demo- 
graphy. In 1890, the African population 
in Rhodesia numbered about 700 000 in 
an area of 150 000 km (Rolin, 1978). In 
1893, African livestock numbered 
approximately 400 000 head (Palmer, 
1977). By 1910, the African population 
was approximately 900 000; together with 
700 000 head of cattle all were now 
crowded into Native Reserves comprising 
70 000 km (or 8,7 million hectares). This 
crowding was aggiavated by the 
competition among peasants to acquire 
and retain the limited amount of good 
land available in the NRs. 
The settlers (who in 1910 numbered 
about 20 000) occupied 60 000 km 
(6 million hectares) of prime farming 
land (Palmer, 1977). By 1930, with the 
rural African population numbering 
approximately 1,3 million and possessing 
1 million head of livestock, the demographic pressure in the 
NRs was clearly apparent. Not only were there conflicts 
between the administration and peasants, and between 
settler and African farmers, there were also acute intra- 
social disputes between and among families, chiefs and 
headmen for security of tenure. The rights to allocate, use 
and retain land often produced tensions that led to violence 
between people. 
Another problem area was farm labour. During the first 
decade of the century, rural Africans produced 2,5 million 
bags of grain annually for their own use and for sale. The 
state responded by introducing the Maize Council Act. This 
inverted maize prices in a deliberate effort to buttress settler 
farms at the expense of so-called "kaffir-farming", and to 
force peasants to seek employment as labourers on these 
farms. 
Methods used to force peasants to provide labour were 
often violent; the police and informal African agents of the 
police (known as "boys") press-ganged rural people into 
labour through liberal use of threats and beatings (Wheeler, 
1972). The "ticket system" was used by settler farm-owners 
to control and dominate their workers,1° and many workers 
were exploited and abused. Their situation was worsened by 
the notorious 1901 Masters and Servant Ordinance, which 
made it difficult for workers to receive compensation for 
duty or abuse-related injuries. However, severe penalties 
were exacted from workers for the smallest infringements 
against their employers (Mtetwa, 1987). 
The result was a national legacy of physical and verbal 
abuse of farm-workers by settlers (and, at times, by higher 
ranking Africans). Allied to this was a history of non- 
compensation from the administration or from traditional 
authorities (chiefs and headmen). The chiefs were generally 
co-opted into the state system; there was also a tacit 
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Inverted maize prices 
impoverished African tanners, 
forcing them to seek work 
as labourers on white-owned 
farms in the early 1 900s 
assumption that the farm-workers had forfeited their 
traditional rural rights by living in farm compounds, and 
were thus outside the scope of traditional or state 
authorities for protection or redress. 
1930 — 1959: State Intervention and Peasant 
Resistance 
In January 1925, the Rhodesian government appointed the 
Morris Carter Land Commission to examine ways in which 
the growing land problem could be resolved. The 
Commission presented its Report in November 1925, 
recommending slight increases in the land allocation to 
both the settlers and Africans. This report became the basis 
for the 1931 Land Apportionment Act (LAA), which 
codified the racial division of land in Rhodesia. Table I 
indicates land distribution under the LAA. 
TABLE 1 
Category Acres Percentage 
(of land) 
European (settler) Area 19 179 174 50,8 
Native Reserves 12 600 000 22,4 
Native Purchased Areas 7 646 566 7,7 
Forest Area 590 506 0,6 
Unassigned Area 17 793 300 18,4 
Undetermined Area 88 540 0,1 
Total 98686080 100,0 
Source: (Palmer, 1977 p. 147) 
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The LAA was designed primarily to appease the anxieties 
of white settlers. This allocation of land on an essentially 
racial basis, and with no clear indication of whether or how 
land distribution fitted in with demographics, soil quality 
and climate, showed that the state was essentially fulfilling a 
racial/political agenda with agro-economic sub-themes, 
rather than vice versa. The LAAs intention was to safeguard 
the settler agricultural system, because by the mid-1920s, 
these farmers had emerged as the single most powerful 
grouping in the country. 
Next, the administration turned its attention to the 
equally contentious problem of land utiisation, in other 
words, farming methods. The targets here were the Native 
Reserves, with "centralisation" becoming the interventionist 
solution. "Originally designed as a conservation measure... 
by which a division was made between exclusive arable and 
exclusively grazing land, 'centralisation' became a means of 
redistributing land in the Reserves" (Palmer, 1983). Land in 
the NRs was surveyed, pegged out, and "lines" were laid 
down for fields, houses and villages. 
Centralisation was allied to the new gospel of soil 
conservation. Previously, soil conservation in the Reserves 
was confined to the protection of arable land, but from the 
mid-1940s, the mandate was increased to include the 
protection of grazing areas by pasture furrows and other 
measures (such as road contour drains, check dams for gully 
control, tree planting and fencing of critical areas). Grass 
buffer strips were introduced in 1948. By 1950, the state 
claimed that 507 000 areas (22 per cent of cultivated lands) 
were protected against erosion by these measures (Rolin, 
1977). 
The period between 1940 and 1955 saw the introduction 
of a slew of highly interventionist and often arbitrary land 
allocation/utilisation measures, of which the most 
important were the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 
1952 and the Natural Resources Act (NRA) of 1942. In both 
cases, the dissonance between means and ends led to 
problems. While claiming that the goal was to save the 
country from agro-economic and environmental 
catastrophe, the means used — protectionism, compulsion 
and force — raised doubts about the real objectives. These 
Acts were also heavily influenced by the Mclllwaine 
Commission of Enquiry Report (1939). The Report was 
unequivocal about blaming Africans for the looming 
catastrophe: "the result of the deliberate laying waste of 
large areas of land by wasteful and destructive methods of 
cultivation has been a cry by Natives for more land" 
(Weinmann, 1991). The tacit agenda was to show that 
Africans agro-economic behaviour was inherently 
destructive, unsustainable and thoughtless. 
Meanwhile, the demographic problems continued. By 
1945, the white settler population had increased to 140 000, 
including 68 000 living on 6 408 farms (Iliffe, 1990). The 
African population had increased to 4 million (with 
2,8 million in the rural areas), with its rural population 
density increasing from 10 persons per km2 to 33 persons 
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Agricultural products are one of the major generators of Zimbabwe's national income. 
per km2. By 1955, 55 of the 98 Native Reserves were 
overpopulated (Palmer, 1997), both in terms of people and 
of livestock. 
In 1896, rinderpest had devastated the herds of the 
nation, leaving only 25 000 head of cattle in the entire 
country (Patel, 1985). Nevertheless, there was a major 
increase in the cattle population in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. In 1910, Africans owned 250 000 head of 
cattle. By 1925, this had increased to one and a half million. 
By 1930, the cattle population alone numbered nearly two 
million, and if sheep and goats were included, the total 
number of livestock approached the three million mark 
(Patel, 1985). 
Once again, the state found a politically convenient 
explanation to justify its solution of de-stocking. The 
Herskowitz "cattle complex" theory (1926) put forward the 
view that reluctance by Africans to sell or kill cattle either 
for the market or privately, and their apparent indifference 
to overgrazing, stemmed from their cultures and traditions 
(Rhodesian Farmer, 1926). Africans, it was argued, held 
onto their animals for reasons of "prestige and status' 
regardless of the agro-economic environment. In other 
words, it was implied that the societal norms of Africans 
overrode the needs of agro-environmental development. 
Having thus "proved" that it was the "irrational" 
behaviour of Africans and not its own laws that were the 
root cause of the land problem, the administration began 
using a combination of persuasion and force to ensure 
compliance with its policies. Chiefs and headmen were 
rewarded with money, regalia and other tokens of state 
appreciation if they persuaded their people to peacefully 
comply with the provisions of the various land Acts. The 
period 1935 — 1955 saw the forcible removal of 67 000 
African families from their traditional lands into new NRs 
to make way for white-owned farms on state woodlands 
(Magaya, 1981). Bulldozers were used to raze homes and 
armed police rounded up villagers in trucks. Although I 
have been unable to find reliable evidence of deaths 
occurring directly as a result of these forced removals, 
archival records detail a number of cases of beatings of 
recalcitrant villagers and even headmen. 
De-stocking was also forcedly implemented: "Govern- 
ment Notice No. 612 of 29/11/1944 declared that 49 NRs 
were overstocked and laid down the stock-carrying capacity 
of each. From 1946 — 1979, 1126 366 head of cattle were 
disposed of" (Weinmann, 1991). Once again, leverage was 
exerted on chiefs and headmen, who were given culling 
quotas that their villages had to meet. Failure to meet these 
quotas resulted in the chief and sometimes the entire village 
having to pay fines. In other cases, police confiscated "excess 
cattle" from the villagers without paying compensation. 
The Demonstrators tasked with enforcing land use rules 
were themselves a source of conflict. It was their job to 
enforce contour ridging, prevent stream bank cultivation 
and the planting of rice and maize in the vleis. At times, the 
enthusiasm with which the Demonstrators carried out these 
TRACK TWO May 2000 9 
Zimbabwe is one of the world's largest tobacco producers. 
Land became one of the 
rallying cries of peasant 
conscientisation during 
the Second Chimurenga 
tasks led to clashes. In 1947, for instance, 17 peasants 
farmers, including a headmen, were fined for assaulting 
Demonstrators in Bindura District (Palmer, 1977). Fines 
were also levied on those who refused to plough contour 
ridges, and the crops of those who had planted in vleis and 
along ridges were destroyed. 
State legislation engendered two ongoing responses. The 
first was passive resistance. Peasants were ordered to build 
roads and enact soil conservation measures, working on 
drain strips, galley dams, contour ridges and rotational 
grazing. But the conscript labourers resisted by either not 
doing the work at all, or deliberately doing their jobs 
inadequately. "In October 1952 (in Makoni Area), 48 152 
yards of grass strips had to be repaired, 31 963 yards of grass 
buffer strips had to be repegged after being destroyed by 
landholders" (Ranger, 1985). 
The second result was open resistance to the NLHA. 
Demonstrators and white land-development officers were 
attacked, verbally and physically, as were some chiefs and 
headmen who tried to implement the new measures. 
In 1955, Kesiya Madzorera, the Gokwe representative of 
Benjamin Burombo's African Voice11 was charged with 
defying section 49 of the Natural Reserves Act. (He had 
cleared trees from and ploughed 25 acres more than he was 
"legally" entitled to.) The case became politicised, he 
appealed against the fine, and the case was dismissed. Kesiya 
became a folk hero and peasant farmers subsequently took 
their resistance even further. "Freedom ploughing' which 
defied the allocations and prohibitions of the NLHA, 
became the most effective weapon that was used to blunt 
implementation of the NLHA nationally. In January 1961, 
the under-secretary for Nature, Agriculture and Lands 
lamented countrywide freedom ploughing: "people were 
ploughing all over the place and disregarding land 
allocations" (Ranger, 1985). The NLHA and efforts to 
enforce it led to the emergence of a new generation of 
African nationalists, and a new brand of nationalism that 
would culminate in war within the next decade.'2 
1960 —1979: Settler Nationalism, Armed 
Resistance and Rural Violence 
In 1963, the hardline conservative party of the settlers, the 
Rhodesia Front (RF) took office. Primarily supported by 
white farmers, the RF mandate was to pull Rhodesia out of 
the Federation, cut links with Britain, and entrench white 
minority rule. In 1969, the RF brought in the Land Tenure 
Act (No. 55). The primary aim of the Land Tenure Act was 
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to update the LAA, providing even more inflexible 
regulations. The main new feature was the redivision of 
Rhodesia into roughly equal African and white areas. The 
Special Native Purchase Areas and Unreserved categories 
were now formally abolished. The settler area was also 
protected by a number of new constitutional safeguards, 
instituted to prevent the legal abolition of land segregation 
(Marshall, 1976). 
However, important grassroots developments concerning 
land use/allocation were also taking place. In 1963, the 
NLHA was suspended and replaced by the Tribal Trust Land 
Bill (TTLB) in 1965. The TTLB established Tribal Law 
Authorities (TLAs) to control land policy in Communal 
Areas (CAs). The regulation and policy of land in Rhodesia 
was now handed over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
which (in theory) recognised tribal law. The aim was to bind 
the chiefs more closely to the state apparatus. 
In reality, however, the TLAs were powerless to enforce 
either farming methods or land allocation. The "freedom 
farming" of the late 1950s continued and a new 
phenomenon arose: the "wanton" destruction of trees, both 
in CAs and on commercial farms (Tilley, 1993). Villagers 
proceeded to strip and, in some cases, uproot small trees. 
This form of resource poaching fulfilled a genuine need 
(trees were used for construction of huts, for firewood/fuel 
and fences); but it was also clearly a form of protest against 
state law. 
There was also an increase in land/boundary conflicts. 
The increased migrations of locals and foreigners into and 
out of kraals, villages, wards and Districts, and the ensuing 
confusion over land entitlements added to the growing 
crisis in the CAs. Various boundary disputes (for instance, 
between individuals and between villages) were 
commonplace, and chiefs were often ignored or over-ruled 
by bureaucrats. The issues of land tenure security and 
inheritance also posed problems. More rural Africans were 
moving to towns in search of jobs, while others sought work 
on farms. However, both the farm and urban dwellers still 
owned or wished to have access to land in rural areas. The 
traditions of polygamy and large families also added to land 
pressures. 
Demography also played a role in the conflicts. In 1909, 
the African population was 3 618 159, whereas by 1962, it 
was 4 817 950 (a 33 per cent increase) (Rhodesian Census of 
Population, 1963). The average annual population growth 
was 15 per cent. Cattle owned by Africans numbered 
approximately 2,5 million by 1970, and if other animals 
were included, this figure rose to over 3 millions (Rhodesian 
Census of Population, 1970). Yet the total quantity of land 
available to Africans had not increased, with the amount of 
fertile land actually diminishing. 
The result was sporadic conflict over land use, land 
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allocation and security of tenure. 
Some of the chiefs in the TLAs were 
assaulted, threatened or killed 
(Ranger, 1985). Others had their 
lands dug up or their trees 
stripped. Some were forced to 
award land grants to locals or so- 
called "foreigners" (not local to that 
particular region). There were also 
serious boundary disputes between 
villages. The period 1961 — 1968 
saw an upsurge in land disputes 
brought before chiefs for 
mediation, as well as an increase in 
fights between individuals and 
families over land (Riddel, 1978). This conflict would soon 
become endemic. 
The Second Chimurenga: 1966 — 1979 
The Second Chimurenga (war of liberation) initially began 
in the early 1 960s as primarily urban forms of protest 
against an increasingly repressive state. The Rhodesian 
Police crushed these protests, jailing hundreds. This 
radicalised nationalists, who began to consider armed 
resistance necessary. Ironically, even though the land issue 
was one of the original underlying reasons for the war, it 
would be some years before the nationalists formally began 
to conscientise the peasants. During the second 
Chimurenga, violence (both "loud" and "silent") reached a 
peak. An estimated 50 000 people of all races (but mainly 
Africans) died in the war, with countless others injured 
(Evans, 1982). The bulk of casualties occurred in the rural 
areas, most of which were operational areas. The 
distinguishing feature of this conflict was the systematic and 
sustained (but sometimes arbitrary) use of violence. "Loud 
violence" took the form of whippings, beatings, torture and 
murder. The violence was mainly perpetrated upon civilians 
by Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), police and the 
guerrillas; an often overlooked feature was the increase in 
violence among civilians themselves. The Second 
Chimurenga was as much a civil war as it was a war of 
liberation. 
The Second Chimurenga may actually have been 
"zvimurenga" (wars of liberation rather than a single war of 
liberation). Nationalist historians such as Ranger and 
Moorcraft have portrayed the nationalist struggle as a 
monolithic, unified and purposeful "just war" However, 
Sithole (1978) gives insights into the internal leadership 
struggles of the liberation movements, while Kriger (1989) 
examines the issues of violence between the guerrillas and 
peasants and among the peasants themselves. While the 
overall rubric of a war of liberation from white minority 
rule is still sustainable, within this 
"just war," were several macro- and 
micro-level civil wars for liberation. 
Coercion and violence were the 
common themes in these processes. 
A battery of repressive security 
laws, including the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Act (1960) and the 
Emergency Powers Act (1960), 
allowed the RSF to carry out violent 
reprisals against guerrillas and 
civilians with little fear of legal 
punishment. As the security 
situation worsened, particularly in 
the Gaza and Manica operational 
sectors of eastern Zimbabwe, so the RSF increasingly 
targeted civilians for torture and murder. This was partly 
because the Rhodesian "Fire Force" tactical doctrine called 
for a "body count" approach, in which successes were 
measured by the number of dead bodies brought back after 
a battle. As guerrilla resistance hardened, however, 
Rhodesian forces were increasingly forced to make up the 
numbers of dead bodies with civilians, either killed in the 
crossfire or shot out of hand. In an echo of BSAP tactics in 
the 1896 — 1897 war, the RSF also increasingly used a 
scorched earth policy, sometimes razing entire villages, 
shooting or stealing livestock, and burning crops. 
Land became one of the rallying cries of peasant 
conscientisation, as peasants were well aware of local land 
grievances. The guerrillas' task was to elevate the personal 
and local discontent of the peasants to a national level, and 
to make them aware that the war was being fought to 
redress the historical experience of land dispossession. This 
politicisation process was neither quick nor easy. Indeed, 
while they advocated the necessity of using force against the 
settler state, the guerrillas nevertheless used force against 
the peasants. The guerrillas could not survive without 
peasant support; however, the methods used to recruit that 
support involved not only persuasion but violent coercion 
(Kriger, 1988). 
This led to a paradox: nationally, the guerrilla war was a 
protracted one, but at a local level, because of the 
omnipresent danger of the RSF and "sell-outs' the 
politicisation and mobiisation process was often done with 
haste and violence. Methods of politicisation could be either 
protracted or abrupt, depending on the area. In areas where 
they had control, the guerrillas held day-time politicisation 
meetings to explain who they were and what they were 
fighting for; they would also try to convince the peasants 
that they all shared a similar cause. In less secure areas, 
however, the guerrillas often held "pungwes" (night-time 
rallies). "Pungwes" evolved from initially hesitant meetings 
in the early 1970s to confident gatherings in the late 1970s. 
With the guerrillas moving in groups of 200 to 300, and 
establishing an overwhelming presence among the peasant 
Opposite: "The guerrillas could not survive without peasant support; however, the methods used to recruit that support 
involved not only persuasion but violent coercion." 
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1961 — 1968 saw an upsurge 
in land disputes brought before 
chiefs for mediation, and an 
increase in tights between 
individuals and families 
over land 
communities, the RSF did not often dare to attack the 
gatherings (especially in Gaza Province). 
However, the guerrillas did not always have this 
advantage. In unfamiliar areas and/or areas held by the RSF, 
the guerrillas of necessity conducted their politicisation and 
recruitment campaigns abruptly and haphazardly. Because 
there was little time to persuade locals to support their 
cause, support was often garnered through coercion. This 
created confusion in the minds of villagers — violence was 
being used to persuade them to perform violence against 
state violence. Local situations and contexts were also not 
taken into account during these recruitment campaigns. For 
example, in 1970 in Gokwe, local peasants denied having 
land grievances against local white farmers and 
administration, as they enjoyed modest local population 
densities, good soils and a low level of state intervention. 
The guerrillas insisted, however, that the national land 
grievance was also a local land grievance, and that Gokwe 
peasants had no choice but to play a role in the struggle. 
This was one example of a local land grievance being 
invented in order to fulfil a national mandate (Mhepo, 
1985). 
Guerrillas were also drawn into rural class and power 
conflicts between chiefs and headmen, wealthy and poorer 
peasants, shop-owners and different levels of farm workers. 
As they often lacked the time to investigate these socio- 
economic issues, guerrillas sometimes resorted to hasty and 
unwarranted steps against alleged wrongdoers. 
However, the war did not lead to a complete breakdown 
of rural law and order. The situation (from a Rhodesian 
perspective) was indeed bleak: guerrilla infiltration 
increased, even as state legislation and the size of the RSF 
increased and there were more and more breakdowns in 
state power in the rural areas. The entire country had 
become an operational zone. The agro-economic situation 
rapidly became untenable as more and more white farmers 
abandoned their farms.13 The war caused continuous 
internal rural and rural/city migrations, and in many areas, 
peasants implemented freedom farming. 
Even in this context of rural crisis, order was enforced 
through violence. With regard to land allocations, Protected 
Villages (PVs) were established to monitor the peasants and 
cut their contact with the guerrillas. Although the guerrillas 
still infiltrated the PV's, harsh regulations governing land 
plots and tenure and enforced curfews maintained some 
form of control over land use and allocation. To some 
extent, the guerrillas themselves enforced land policies. 
Chief/headmen whom they found guilty of selling or giving 
land to outsiders were punished. "Kutengesa ivhu" (selling 
traditional land) could result in death to both seller and 
buyer (Kriger, 1988). 
In addition (and this is an issue worthy of further 
research), for all the guerrillas' attempts to rally peasants 
with the promise that the war was being fought to force 
settlers off the land, peasants did not invade abandoned 
white farms during the war. For instance, in Manicaland 
between 1973 — 1979, 1122 white farms were abandoned, 
but neither farm buildings nor land were occupied, even 
temporarily, by the supposedly land-hungry peasants. This 
was partly due to peasant fears of RSF reprisals, but also 
because the villagers had been warned against, and in some 
areas, punished by the guerrillas for unsanctioned land 
occupations. The message the guerrillas sent was clearly that 
land redistribution would occur after, not during the war. 
This message was buttressed by the peasants' own 
imperatives; at the time, they had a practical need to 
consolidate their own land-holdings rather than seek new 
land in unfamiliar areas. Moreover, chiefs and spirit 
mediums — the guardians of traditional land customs — 
The message the guerrillas 
sent was clearly that land 
redistribution would occur 
after, not during the war 
did not sanction land invasions. 
The war also saw an upsurge of "silent" violence, which 
included the use of defoliants by the Rhodesian Air Force 
and pilots of private planes (Moorecraft and Laughlin, 
1980). In particular, livestock were targeted in two ways. 
First, peasants refused to take their cattle to dip-tanks. These 
protests had began as early as 1964, when peasants in 
Tanda/Makoni filled the local dip-tanks with stones or 
destroyed them. These actions had ominous results: "Before 
the year-long protest was quelled by the arrival of troops in 
helicopters, 400 cattle owners were jailed and at least 3 000 
cattle died from tick-borne diseases" (Ranger, 1985). 
In 1975, there were approximately 8 000 dip-tanks or 
spray races. Dipping was both compulsory and unpopular. 
The guerrillas rallied the peasants to refuse to pay a dip 
fee.14 Villagers were also ordered to destroy dip-tanks, and 
dip attendants were beaten or killed. The subsequent 
closure of dip-tanks and the collapse of the inoculation 
system led to a significant increase in livestock illnesses and 
deaths. Between 1975 and 1979, it was estimated that 250 
000 cattle died from preventable tick borne-disease (The 
Farmer, 1978). The increase in murders of livestock, health 
Inspectors and field workers was also alarming, and was 
associated with an outbreak of trypanosomiasis (sleeping 
sickness) among cattle in 1976 in the north-east of the 
country. 
More direct forms of attack on cattle were stock theft and 
mutilation, which were also gestures of resistance against 
the state and white commercial farmers. By 1976, the 
situation had become so serious that the Stock Theft 
Amendment Act was introduced; it increased the minimum 
sentence to ten years.'5 Both guerrillas and villagers stole, 
mutilated and killed commercially-farmed cattle. In some 
cases, pedigree cattle were simply shot and left to rot as a 
sign of contempt. However, the violence against livestock 
became reciprocal. The RSF and the police in turn 
confiscated or "liberated" villagers' livestock, often in broad 
daylight and at gunpoint. White farmers formed vigilante 
groups in some areas to recover their cattle, seizing and 
killing villagers' livestock (The Farmer, July 6 1978). In 1979, 
the government launched Operation Bulldog, an RSF/Police 
response to fight stock theft and escalating crop theft in the 
Operational Areas. 
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At the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, two important 
agreements reached between the various political parties 
and the British government were that the new constitution 
would remain inviolate for at least ten years,'6 and that the 
property rights of commercial farmers would be 
protected.'7 After 1980, the new government, anxious to 
attract foreign investment, underlined its "reconciliation" 
theme by declaring that white farmers were not the enemy 
and were in fact a valuable asset to the new Zimbabwe. The 
Tekere incident of 1981,18 as well as allegations of white 
farmers/Fifth Brigade collusion in Matebeleland against 
"dissidents" and peasants gave some the impression that the 
government was pandering to the white lobby. 
The vulnerability of white farmers to bandit attack and to 
farm murders between 1981 — 198719 may actually have 
strengthened the farmers' bargaining power with the state. 
This vulnerability gave them the status of innocent victims 
and veterans of continuing violence who were in need of 
state assistance. As Stromm (1988) points out, "the 
government continued to give political statements of intent 
by announcing agricultural revisions such as the Land 
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The Second Chimurenga saw an upsurge of "silent" violence, which included the killing 
of cattle belonging to settlers. 
LAND AND VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE 
1980— 1999 
Acquisition Act (1985), but in reality the whites were co- 
opting government into their mainstream, rather than vice 
versa' 
During the 1980s, the parameters 
of the land crisis widened 
considerably. This was no longer 
just a question of finding more land 
for a spatially fixed but increasing 
population: there was now the 
added dimension of resettling 
thousands of displaced people. 
Resettlement had become an 
integral part of the land allocation 
problem. The government's plan was to resettle 18 000 
families on about 1,2 million hectares of land that had been 
abandoned during the war. In 1982, however, the number of 
settlers targeted for resettlement was raised to 162 000 
families on 10 million hectares. By 1990, the government 
had acquired 3,5 million hectares presumably for this 
purpose (Moyo, 1987), but a key problem was that only 19 
per cent of the land acquired was prime land, the rest was 
either mediocre or unsuitable for agricultre or grazing. 
The demographics were also unsettling. In 1982, the 
population of the GAs was 3,9 million, and the average 
population density was 27 people per km2, (although in 
Manicaland and Masvingo, this increased to 80 people per 
km in some districts) (Zimbabwe Government Population 
Census, 1983). By 1987, the population in the CAs had risen 
to 5,1 miflion, the national average population was 
approximately 6,5 million, and the national average 
population density was 36 people per km2 (Zimbabwe 
Government Population Census, 1987). Numbers of cattle 
had fluctuated because of drought and other factors, but by 
1988, the cattle in the CAs had 
increased to nearly 2 million, with 
increased pressure on the land as a 
result. 
By the 1990s, it was clear that 
Zimbabwe was faced with a crisis 
concerning land use (both agri- 
cultural and environmental), as 
well as land allocation. Defores- 
tation had reached serious 
proportions, along with siltation, overgrazing, stream-bank 
cultivation, gullying and general loss of bio-diversity. 
Commercial farmers revived the traditional stereotype of 
destructive peasant farmers and attributed the problems to 
them (The Farmer, May 4, 1990). 
Others believed that while some of the land practices in 
the CAs were destructive, the real issue was not farming 
practices, but embedded socio-economic problems that led 
to destructive land usage methods. These problems 
included overpopulation and overcrowding on good land 
and increasing rural poverty (caused by various factors 
including drought, fewer jobs on farms, low yields, lower 
prices for products, transport problems, lack of funds for 
equipment, lack of infra-structural assistance, lack of 
adequate representation with the bureaucracy, lack of 
security of tenure and increasing familial dysfunctions in 
the CAs).2° 
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Resettlement had become 
an integral part of the land 
allocation problem 
Another theory laid the blame on the culture of"madiro", 
postulating that the general breakdown of law and order 
and the upsurge of violence during the war of liberation had 
led to a rural culture of"madiro" (we do as we please). This 
culture opposes bureaucracy not so much because of its 
history of interventionist and exclusionary approaches to 
solving rural problems, but because "madiro" often involves 
opposition for the sake of 
opposition (Cheater, 1994). 
Thus, the apparently self- 
destructive land policies and 
continuous destruction of 
woodlands and wetlands can be 
seen as a historically continuous 
protest against state bureau- 
cracy. However, this view 
negates the possibility that many 
environmentally destructive 
practices are in fact short-term survival strategies in the face 
of an increasingly harsh social and land environment. 
The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
was introduced in 1990. Its underlying principles were that 
deregulation, privatisation and reduction of government 
subsidies, although initially harsh medicine, would 
ultimately benefit the economy and lead to increased IMF 
and World Bank assistance. It was touted as an antidote to 
the protectionist, centralised economy of the 1980s. 
However, its implementation coincided with the drought of 
1990 — 1993. This resulted in increasing unemployment, 
inflation and high prices,2' as well as aggravated rural problems. 
The government, under pressure from its rural 
constituency, pushed through the Land Acquisition Act 
(1992), which entitled the government to designate 
commercial farms for resettlement.22 Under the terms of 
the Act, the government gave notice that it would be 
acquiring commercial (mainly white-owned) farms for 
redistribution purposes. This exercise has proved to be 
singularly controversial, both 
nationally and internationally.23 
Many white commercial farmers 
initially opposed the 1992 Act itself, 
but since then the Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU) appears to be 
divided between those who still 
oppose the entire "Designation" 
exercise and those who accept the 
need to sacrifice land for resettlement 
(albeit while opposing the modalities 
of redistribution). Conflicting political statements (by a 
number of role-players associated with this issue) that 
oscillate between militant and conciliatory rhetoric have 
aggravated the land crisis, leading to a diplomatic rift 
between the Zimbabwean and British governments. The 
British government insists that it is not opposed to land 
redistribution per se, provided that this is done in a 
transparent manner with the intention of alleviating rural 
poverty. It has however, accused the Zimbabwean 
government of failing to satisfactorily explain the modalities 
of land redistribution/designation, as well as failing to 
establish the necessary infrastructures to make it a 
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Deforestation, siltation, 
overgrazing, stream-bank 
cultivation, gullying and loss of 
bio-diversity contributed to the 
land crisis in the 1 990s 
During the 1990s "squatters" — peasants — began to occupy white-owned farms. 
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sustainable and achievable goal (The Independent, 
November 8, 1997). They have thus been reluctant to 
finance land reform plans. The Zimbabwean government 
has retaliated by claiming that the real agenda of the British 
is to protect the neo-colonialist agenda of expatriate agro- 
business (The Herald, September 14, 1997). 
At the domestic level, two important developments have 
occurred. In the mid- 1980s, in response to failure of the 
resettlement exercise, landless peasants began to occupy and 
use land that belonged to the politicians and the black elite. 
These communities were termed 
"squatters" by the media, and in 
some areas, police and army units 
were deployed to forcibly remove 
them. Numerous arrests were made 
and bulldozers and trucks were used 
to raze their dwellings and remove 
their property, reminiscent of the 
forced evictions 40 years earlier by 
the colonial state. 
In Matebeleland, this exercise was carried out with an 
exceptional degree of violence. Crops were burnt; villagers 
were openly murdered or simply disappeared. Atrocities 
performed by the Fifth Brigade in the "dissident" war that 
took place between 1981 and 1987 (Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace, 1994). The genuine land grievances of 
Matebeleland peasants were subsumed by a wider and 
brutal struggle against a local insurgency of ex-ZIPRA 
combatants. (ZIPRA was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union (ZAPU); it fought mainly in the 
South and Western areas of the country during the Second 
Chimurenga.) The government saw the Matabeleland 
peasants as part of the problem and by the time of the Unity 
Accord in 1987 an estimated 6 000 rural people in 
Matebeleland had became casualties of this "dirty" war. This 
war, initially against ex-ZIPRA combatants (some of whom 
were sponsored or whose units had been infiltrated by 
South African soldiers) had by the mid-1980s widened in 
scope; the dissidents now included traumatised peasants 
and jobless youths. The worsening effects of drought and 
dessertification in Matebeleland and the blatant diversion of 
environmental resources to Mashonaland also alienated 
sentiment in Matebeleland. That the dissident war was in 
many ways a continuation of the ethnic and ideological 
conflict between ZAPU and ZANU transposed to post- 
independent Zimbabwe — is undeniable. But what is often 
overlooked is that it was also a conflict over environmental 
resources. It was in some ways a protest against ZANU 
apathy and ZAPU failure to prevent the desertification of 
Matebeleland. 
During the 1990s, the "squatters" began to occupy white- 
owned farms. In June 1998, hundreds of peasants moved 
onto farms in the Marondera area. These "Svosve villagers" 
triggered a series of copycat "invasions" in other areas, 
including Bindura. The results were intriguing and 
paradoxical. Commercial farmers had already upgraded 
farm security during the second Chimurenga era, using 
Agric-Alert systems.24 There were claims that the farm 
invasions were a political ploy to force white farmers off the 
land (The Farmer, July 27, 1998). Many farmers vowed to 
fight the squatters, and they certainly possessed the 
necessary weapons to do so.25 Others vowed to uproot 
squatter crops. However, defiant squatters threatened to set 
alight any tractor that entered "their" land. Others began to 
cut down trees on the commercial farms. The situation was 
made more tense by a series of murders, robberies and 
assaults on commercial farmers and their families in 
Mashonaland East. There were apocalyptic fears that these 
were not random acts but the precursors of a general rural 
uprising against white commercial farmers (The Farmer, 
July 27, 1998). This upsurge in "silent" violence and militant 
rhetoric seemed to foretell a catastrophic outbreak of "loud" 
violence. 
However, there were in fact few 
incidents of "loud" violence 
between the squatters and 
commercial farmers. Villagers on 
the farm of Harry Orphanides (the 
Marondera CFU Chairman) 
chanted revolutionary songs and 
occasionally made threatening 
gestures, but did not physically 
abuse farmers or farm-workers or 
damage property. Orphanides later commented, "I was 
really surprised. They seemed quite well-disciplined and 
their leader Mapranga, who I believe is a War Veteran, kept 
them in line. Things got a little tense but it could have been 
a lot worse" (The Farmer, August 3, 1998). 
The reason for the absence of "loud" violence was mostly 
due to the restraint and compromise shown on all sides. 
Although most commercial farmers were equipped with 
firearms, in their discussions with the villagers and police, 
they made a point of not openly displaying their weapons, 
which could have been deemed provocative. The villagers 
reciprocated by not destroying any property: "We know that 
vabhunu (whites) have got guns, if they had threatened us 
with guns, we would have set fire to their houses... This 
land is ours" (The Farmer, August 16, 1988). 
THE WAR VETERANS: 1980 — 2000 
The twin socio-economic catastrophes of increased rural 
poverty and the AIDS pandemic foregrounded the issue of 
war veterans in the national consciousness. By 1992, 
Zimbabwe had approximately 2 million unemployed 
citizens, with a spiralling cost of living in both rural and 
urban areas. Although many ex-combatants were 
successfully re-integrated into urban or rural life after 1980, 
a substantial number slipped deeper into destitution and 
social ostracism. In 1980, there were approximately 65 000 
ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas. About 20 000 of these 
became part of the new Zimbabwe National Army. The rest, 
who were officially demobiised, were awarded a monthly 
pension of Z$185 until 1983 and encouraged to form self- 
help co-operatives and/or receive skills training (Musemwa 
1996). Beyond this, there was little national attempt to assist 
their socio-economic re-integration. By 1995, studies 
showed that at least a quarter of Zimbabwe's rural 
population was earning less than the poverty datum figure 
of Z$4 000 per annum; nor were they growing sufficient 
crops or keeping enough livestock to feed their families 
(CSO Demographic and Health survey, 1995). 
Many ex-combatants had become victims of the twin 
scourges of poverty and AIDS. Many of the dead and dying 
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The upsurge in "silent" violence 
and militant rhetoric in the 1 990s 
seemed to foretell a catastrophic 
outbreak of "loud" violence 
Chengerai "Hitler" Hunzvi, leader of the Zimbabwe Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) with supporters. 
were well-known in their local areas as genuine ex-fighters. 
After the war, however, they were ignored. Villagers were 
often resentful of party functionaries who eulogised heroes 
in death, yet ignored them while they lived (Parade, 1993). 
The gap between the ruling party and grassroots 
communities increased, as did the sense that the 
government was misappropriating the Second Chimurenga 
by manufacturing a self-serving mythology for itself. 
In April 1989, the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association 
(ZWVA) was formed, comprising ex-combatants from 
ZANLA and ZIPRA. It was observed that "the formation of 
ZWVA was a reactive initiative taken by ex-combatants 
when it had became clear that government had failed to 
assist them" (Musemwa, 1996). 
It has also been argued that the war veterans issue became 
a contest between government and ex-combatants over the 
question of who possessed legitimate war credentials 
(Financial Gazette, November 3, 1997). By 1991, the 
government (after initially ignoring the ZWVA) began 
negotiations with it regarding the War Veterans 
Administration Bill (1991), the War Veterans Act (1992) and 
War Victims Compensation Act (1993). The administering 
of compensation for war victims, however, was grossly 
inefficient and corrupt. In theory, all proven ex-combatants 
who had been injured during the liberation war were 
entitled to financial compensation on a scale proportional 
to the severity of their injuries. In practice, however, the 
system became increasingly chaotic between 1993 — 1996. 
Controversy over differing official and grassroots 
definitions of war veterans, interventions by the ZANU-PF 
party hierarchy, falsified injury claims and a general lack of 
accountability saw the government paying out nearly Z$80 
million, all too often to those least in need. The 
government's failure to financially compensate grassroots 
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ex-combatants, especially those who had genuine war 
credentials and who had genuinely suffered, precipitated a 
political and financial crisis in 1997. 
At the ZANU-PF summit in Mutare in September 1997, 
President Mugabe bowed to pressure from the war veterans 
and announced a package for war veterans that would pay 
each genuine war veteran a lump sum of Z$50 000 and a 
gratuity for life of Z$5 000 per month (The Herald 
September 17, 1997). The cost to the nation of this largesse 
was estimated at Z$4 billion, and precipitated a national 
financial crisis. Ironically, it also prompted a crisis within 
the war veterans' movement. The Chidyausiku Commission 
(appointed in August 1997 to investigate abuses in the War 
Victims Compensation payouts from 1993 — 1997) split the 
ZWVA into factions which either opposed or approved the 
investigation. This friction was accompanied by power 
struggles between ZWVA chairman Chenjerai Hunzwi and 
various rivals. Hunzwi came in for increasing criticism for 
his authoritarian control of ZWVA, and was accused by 
some of having presidential ambitions. The government, 
wary and tired of the ZWVA's demands, moved to sideline 
the organisation. Hunzwi's claims in 1999 that the 1997 
disbursements were essentially a statement of intent by 
government and that every war veteran is in fact entitled to 
Z$500 000 further alienated the government (The 
Independent, June 4, 1999). By mid-1999, however, factional 
struggles within the war veterans' movement and mounting 
criticism of the government were bringing the two sides 
closer to the rapprochement that was to become so evident 
The government failed 
to realise that many of the 
rural poor and squatters 
being evicted from farms 
were war veterans 
in 2000. By 2000, Hunzvi's war veterans had effectively 
become the "military wing" of ZANU-PF in the "war" 
against white commercial farmers. 
Land was one of the war veterans' primary grievances. Ex- 
combatants, war veterans and civilian war veterans were 
united in their displeasure with government land policy 
The ruling party was accused of taking prime land and 
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President Robert Mugabe 
Presidents Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Laurent Kabila (DRC). 
doing little to assist the rural poor. The government 
meanwhile failed to realise that many of the rural poor and 
even some of the squatters being evicted from farms were 
actually war veterans. Many of the latter would ultimately 
claim financial compensation, partly because they had been 
denied land compensation. Interestingly, many war veterans 
bought agricultural implements (especially tractors) with 
their 1997 payouts. Generally, they tried to improve land 
utilisation methods rather than pressure government for 
better land allocation. This latter aspect has remained an 
issue for peasants and squatters. It also needs to be 
mentioned that there have been some disputes between war 
veterans and peasants over land. In the early 1990s, 
government agreed that 20 per cent of all resettlement land 
would be reserved for war veterans, with the rest going to 
landless peasants (The Farmer, July 7, 1994). But allocation 
and prioritisation disputes over land resettlement have led 
some peasants to complain that war veterans, who had 
already received financial compensation, were also receiving 
preferential treatment in land allocation at their expense 
(The Daily News, September 6, 1999). 
Moreover, demands for compensation went further than 
war veterans' demands for compensation for fighting 
against the RSF. There was also a need for redress for the 
trauma and injuries that civilians experienced at the hands 
of the RSF, the guerrillas, and their fellow villagers Iisriger, 
1988). This in turn led to the formation of the Ex-Detainees 
and Retrenchees Association and War Collaborators 
Association. Its members also claimed to be war veterans 
and pressed the government for compensation. The funds 
already paid out to the war veterans and the compensation 
claimed by other disgruntled groups, may be the price the 
government has had to pay to civilians for not revealing the 
horrors they endured at the hands of their own people in 
the liberation war. In addition, this compensation was for 
government failure to fulffl its wartime promises. As one 
interviewee stated: "You know, government negotiating 
with the ZWVA was its "ku bvuma mhosva" (admission of 
guilt). "Van kupara mhosva (they are paying damages) to us'26 
However, a corollary problem is that Africans were not 
the only war veterans. Coloured war veterans also 
successfully petitioned for government redress (The Herald, 
November 28, 1997). In addition, even though they were 
not included in the official definition of war veterans, there 
is little doubt that whites and white farmers in particular see 
themselves as "war veterans' They too fought for what they 
believed was their land. Those who survived the wars of 
liberation and dissidence feel that the land is their 
compensation and their heritage, and that is why they are 
committed to keeping it (The Farmer, August 4, 1997). 
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Violent clashes between supporters of the ruling party and opposition party in the run-up to the June elections. 
Another aspect of Zimbabwe's land, violence and 
compensation saga, which can be briefly mentioned, is 
Zimbabwe's involvement in the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). In June 1998, the Zimbabwean 
government sent the first units of what would eventually 
total 11 000 troops into the DRC. The DRC operation had 
an indirect link with the land issue; squatter representatives, 
owners of designated farms, some opposition parties and 
international organisations have claimed that the funds that 
the Zimbabwean government is spending on the DRC 
conflict is money that was originally earmarked for poverty 
alleviation and resolving the land problem (The 
Independent, 1999). War veterans themselves have generally 
remained mute or been moderately supportive of 
government on this issue. They have, after all already 
received compensation; many are also serving or retired 
members of the ZNA, and their loyalty to the state is 
paramount. 
There has been a more worrying development in recent 
months. In early March 2000, "war veterans" occupied 
white-owned farms throughout Mashonaland. Unlike the 
"walk-on" peasant farm invasions of 1997, which were 
ended with relative ease after negotiations between the 
invaders, farm owners and police, the latest "move-in" 
invasions have been much harder to ameliorate. 
Militancy and Neo-Settlerism 
The main reason for the increasingly desperate agrarian 
situation lies in Zimbabwe's economic decline, which began 
with the drought of 1990 — 1993 and was accelerated by the 
huge war veterans disbursements and the currency crash of 
September/October 1997. As the economy has worsened, 
the government's language, actions and postures have 
become increasingly militant and defensive. 
Increasing international isolation and internal urban 
criticism have pushed the government to seek malleable 
political partners and supporters. The two primary 
constituents favoured for this role are war veterans and 
peasants. The war veterans already "owe the government a 
favour" because of the payouts, but the government is also 
dangling another carrot and stick before them: the promise 
of increasing war veterans' monthly pensions, together with 
the threat that if an opposition government comes to power, 
the war veterans could lose this largesse. The peasants, 
meanwhile, have been promised white land in exchange for 
their vote in the June 2000 elections; and they have also been 
warned that a new government would ignore their needs). 
The current cynical policy of racial scapegoating, of 
blaming a particular racial group (in this case, the white 
farmers) for national problems has its roots in both the 
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The current cynical 
policy of racial 
scapegoating 
white farmers for 
national problems 
has its roots 
in the liberation 
movements and 
settlerism itself 
resistance methodology of the liberation movements (1960 
— 1980) and also in the history of colonialism and settlerism 
itself. During the Second Chimurenga, the levels of 
violence and the politically charged climate did not 
encourage internal or external scrutiny of the realities 
behind the rhetorical claims made on all sides. The 
prevailing attitude of all involved parties was that "those 
who are not for us, are against us". Militancy rather than 
compromise was the norm. In some ways, the current 
government seems to have retreated into its liberation 
movement laager even as it has retained the suppressive 
apparatus of the Rhodesian settler state. The abuses of the 
Emergency Powers Act continue; there is an independent 
Judiciary but its edicts are often ignored (for instance, the 
High Court order instructing ex-combants to vacate 
commercial farms has been challenged by both the 
government and the Attorney-General (Zimbabwe 
Independent, March 24, 2000)); the tendency of 
government to ignore criticism and negotiate only with 
politically useful groups; the placing of the ruling party's 
political survival above national economic survival; all 
these are familiar from the days of the Rhodesian Front 
regime. This tradition of partisan power politics has been 
established for over a century and is likely to continue at 
the expense of national economic development, whatever 
government comes to power. (Some of the "war veterans" 
involved in the latest farm invasions are in fact urban 
ZANU-PF party supporters who are being sponsored by 
the government (Zimbabwe Independent, March 17,2000)). 
Tensions have been further heightened by the fact that 
some farm-workers and owners have armed themselves to 
fight the invaders. In mid-April 2000, two white farmers 
were shot dead by "war veterans" when they attempted to 
forcibly remove invaders from their properties. 
Opposite: War veterans put up a new sign at the entrance to a commercial farm. 
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A farmer, injured in the farm violence, recovers in a hospital. 
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Death and grief in the wake of land violence — funeral of Martin Olds (18 April 2000), a farmer killed during 
the conflict with farm invaders. 
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A beaten up farm worker recovers in hospital. Property damage during the farm invasions. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper does not pretend to be a definitive treatise on 
either Zimbabwe's land problem or the issue of war 
veterans. Rather, it has attempted to indicate certain 
dysfunctional patterns in Zimbabwe's agro-economic and 
environmental history. I have also tried to show that it was 
no coincidence that the land and war veterans' crises 
erupted simultaneously. Both are rooted in the same 
traumas, deprivations and the need for compensation. 
From a historical perspective, there is little doubt that 
most of Zimbabwe's land problems are rooted in the racial 
land allocation policy of the early colonial government. This 
policy was superficially egalitarian and rational; that is, the 
white settlers and Africans were ostensibly to have roughly 
the same amount of land overall. In reality, however, these 
policies were not only racially skewed, but also impractical. 
Little consideration was given to demography, population 
movements, climate and soils (except that the settlers took 
the best land). The colonial state, which was extremely keen 
not to alienate its rural settler constituency, felt obliged to 
provide them with what they wanted; large tracts of land in 
the best climatic and soil zones in the country. Settlers were 
also given a relatively free hand with respect to land 
allocation, and ranchers had no official restraints on the size 
of their livestock herds. The result was an increasing white 
population that acquired more and more land and livestock, 
either through immigration or inheritance. The same 
human and livestock demographic pressures operated in 
the lands allocated to Africans, but these were magnified by 
the restraints imposed by the state in land 
allocation/utilisation, and by the break-down of socio- 
cultural norms stemming from these agrarian dysfunctions. 
These disparities set the scene for the current land conflicts 
among Africans, and between Africans and white farmers. 
The failure to devise a successful land allocation policy 
during the colonial period also compromised land 
utilisation. Africans were crowded into reserves, only to be 
gradually squeezed out of direct competition with white 
farmers in the grain economy during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Their traditional methods of land utiisation and animal 
husbandry were then labelled as primitive and destructive. 
The state attempted to forcibly implement "correct" 
(western) agro-ecological measures, which resulted in a 
pattern of passive resistance until the 1960s, followed by 
increasingly overt and violent resistance. The conflicting 
dynamics between the settler state and the peasant 
communities were deeper than the land issue; the real issue 
was racism, the struggle for political power, and the desire to 
end disruptive state interventionism in land allocation and 
usage. 
The environmental debate was a corollary to the wider 
conflict. It provided the colonial state with a useful 
mythological and methodological tool with which to 
characterise Africans — rural Africans in particular — as 
violent, destructive people who had no clear concept of the 
consequences of their actions. The "apocalypse" thesis was 
used to justify massive state intervention, and when Africans 
resisted agro-ecological protection measures, this merely 
seemed to confirm the original assumptions. For the 
peasants, however, the issue had always been one of survival. 
It appeared to them that each new land Act was designed to 
narrow their options and make daily survival even harder. 
Thus, they resisted in whatever ways they could. Ironically, 
the destructionist thesis became self-fulfilling: Africans were 
characterised as violent and destructive in agro-ecology, and 
at times they were exactly that. The war era "madiro" culture 
further institutionalised resistance to state land control. 
The war of liberation radicalised the peasants. The 
simultaneous breakdown of settler state and traditional 
controls, and the sustained/arbitrary use of violence 
traumatised and radicalised the peasants. After the war, 
demilitarisation took place, and some members of the 
warring armies were successfully integrated into a new 
national army. The remaining ex-combatants were 
demobilised and returned to civilian life. However, the 
statistics on rural crime and violence suggest that attitudinal 
and behavioural demiitarisation lagged behind weapons 
demilitarisation. 
From interviews I conducted in Bindura, it seems there is 
clear consensus among peasants in the GAs and RAs over 
the issue of silent violence. All expressed the view that 
woodland preservation is necessary and that it is bad to cut 
trees, but most of them also stated that tree-cutting is a 
survivalist strategy. The tacit view is that the axe is both a 
tool of survival and a protest weapon against state 
intervention. 
The same attitude applies to farming methods. The old 
controversy over contour ridges remains. Peasants 
acknowledge that contour ridging is a useful land- 
conservation measure, but claim that it is too labour 
intensive and that they will not use it because it is imposed. 
There is also frustration over the government's approach to 
the land problem. Many farmers cannot understand why 
the government simply does not take land from the 
commercial farmers. Some of those interviewed believe that 
the government should use the police and the army to 
forcibly evict white farmers. Others predict that eventually 
they (the peasants) will forcibly retake the land from the 
whites. They have a clear sense that taking the commercial 
farmers' land is compensation not only for the loss of life 
and property in the second Chimurenga, but also for the 
first Chimurenga. 
It must, however, be pointed out that solving the land 
problem is not simply a matter of taking commercial farms 
and redistributing them among the landless. The peasants 
and rural squatters are not a monolithic, homogenous 
group. They comprise different hierarchies of class and 
tribes. Population and migratory pressures have led to 
increased internal tensions among the various groups over 
the question of land rights and security of tenure. 
Zimbabwe's land crisis cannot have a purely racial solution 
— to do so would be to perpetuate the colonial mistake. 
'Whilst conceding that Zimbabwe faces a crisis of "silent" 
(agro-environmental) violence, I believe that the 
Zimbabwean government managed mostly to neutralise the 
threat of "loud" violence from 1980 to 1998. This claim in 
no way negates the brutalities of the dissident war in 
Matebeleland (1981 — 1987); but even that war was not as 
unequivocally violent as the war of liberation and it never 
threatened to become a civil war. The success of Op Merger 
(merging ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSF to create the ZNA) 
also ended the threat of civil war. The ex-combatants were 
successfully demobilised (1980 — 1983), although their re- 
integration into society has been fraught with difficulties. 
For instance, it was not until fairly recently that the 







February 16, 2000 Herald headlines announce the Zimbabwe government's defeat in the Referendum. 
A rally by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of Zimbabwe's 
Chitungizwa, 25 km south of Harare (30 April 2000). opposition party, the MDC. 
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government officially recognised the trauma they suffered 
during the war; other war veterans were disheartened by the 
problems they faced in trying to establish rural co- 
operatives. 
During the 1990s, the government has successfully 
neutralised its most serious political threat, the problems 
posed by war veterans, through a mixture of negotiation, 
compensation, delegitimisation and coercion. The state has 
passed a number of war veterans Acts and continues to 
negotiate with war veterans. Billions of dollars have been 
paid to war veterans through the 
War Victims Compensation Act 
and the War Veterans 
Compensation Act (1993 — 1998). 
The creation of the Chidyausiku 
Commission (August 1998) to 
investigate financial irregularities 
in the war veterans' hierarchy has 
also undermined this group's 
credibility and "stand-alone" 
prowess in society at large. These 
tactics, together with the 
factionalism produced within the 
war veterans' movement can be seen as successful measures 
by the government to neutralise an internal threat. 
Government has reduced the war veterans from a 
potentially powerful political alternative to the ruling party 
(as they threatened to be in 1997) to a recognised but 
politically co-opted special interest group with no more 
political rights than other groups. 
Until 1999, the government had used various methods to 
demilitarise the land issue; "designating" (mainly white- 
owned commercial farms; calling for "designation without 
compensation" to be entrenched in the new draft 
Constitution as a way of legitimising both the state and its 
methods through a process of national consensus-building. 
Scapegoating white commercial farmers and blaming the 
international community continued this process. These 
methods did in fact reduce national threats of "loud" 
violence. However, they have not solved the problem of 
"silent" violence. 
In addition, over the past year, the state has remilitarised 
the land issue. Linguistically, the president has threatened to 
"go back to the trenches" if the white farmers resist (The 
Daily News, April 3, 2000). "War veterans" armed with axes, 
ENDNOTES 
1. Moyo, J. 1995. The Land Question in Zimbabwe. Harare: 
Sapes. 
2. Historically, politics has heavily influenced agrarian decision- 
and opinion-makers, thus clouding the issues. See Leach, M. 
and R. Means, eds, 1996. The Lie of the Land: Challenging 
Received Wisdom of the African Environment. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
3. I have adapted this term from Watts, M. (1985) Silent 
Violence: Food Famine, and Peasantry. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press) She uses "silent violence" to refer to the 
destruction of the Nigerian forests and ecological network. 
4. This paper uses a variegated research methodology, including 
spears and knives have threatened farm-owners, farm- 
workers, and even the police, and some farmers have 
actually been assaulted and killed (The Daily News, April 9, 
2000). The increasing and deliberate delegitimisation of the 
police by the state is a major part of the remilitarisation of 
the land issue. 
Interestingly, the state's most recent attempt to use the 
land issue as a legitimisation technique floundered; in the 
run-up to the national Referendum on the Draft 
Constitution, the state cited designation and land 
resettlement as a major reason why 
citizens should approve the Draft 
Constitution. But the referendum 
(held on February 12 — 13, 2000) 
was instead more of a national 
"stock-taking" of twenty years of 
ZANU-PF rule, than an assessment 
of proposed changes on the land 
issue. The land issue, although 
clearly important, was subsumed in 
the referendum by the issue of 
governance, and it was this that 
resulted in a "no" vote (albeit by a 
narrow margin of 110 000 votes). As the countdown to 
national parliamentary elections in June 2000 begins, there 
is a very real risk of a catastrophic upsurge of "loud' 
racially-based rural violence, together with continuing 
silent violence. Decades of misapplied and cynical political 
state interventions in agrarian socio-economics are now 
being replaced by grassroots and often anarchic land 
solutions. It remains to be seen whether any of these 
solutions are sustainable. 
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primary and secondary published and unpublished works. 
The author also conducted oral interviews with African and 
white farmers, peasants and officials in Bindura district. 
5. The company was somewhat erratic in enforcing this "quit 
rent" 
6. Dr L. S. Jameson provided each military or civilian white 
settler with 1 500 hectares under the terms of this agreement. 
7. After the Ndebele Defeat in 1893, King Lobengula fled to the 
royal capital GuBulawayo and died in exile. 
8. The tribute system was common in Southern Africa at this 
time, but it did have an established hierarchy of rewards and 
punishment. The hut tax, on the other hand, seemed to the 
Shona and Ndebele to be both arbitrary and punitive, with 
no tangible rewards. 
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Decades of misapplied 
state interventions in 
agrarian socio-economics 
are now being replaced by 
grassroots and often 
anarchic land solutions 
Efforts to restore peace 
in Zimbabwe 
Top Left: Members of the Commercial 
Farmers Union meet with war veterans, 
9 May 2000. 
Top Right: Nick Swanepoel, former 
president of the Commercial Farmers 
Union and Chengerai Hunzvi at the 
meeting. 
Left: President Thabo Mbeki has been 
encouraging Zimbabwe to find a 
non-violent solution to its land crisis 
since 1998. 
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9. H.E. Alvord was appointed Agriculturist for Instruction of 
Natives in 1926. He worked with the Department of Native 
Agriculture and Land Development and was Rhodesia's most 
influential agro-environmentalist. 
10. Allied to the ticket system was the pass system to control 
movement of Africans in rural areas and between towns and 
rural areas. 
11. Benjamin Burombo was a Bulawayo-based spokesperson and 
agitator mainly for workers (but also for peasants rights). He 
was arguably the most prominent pre- 1960's Zimbabwean 
nationalist. 
12. A nationalist would later call the NHLA "the best recruiter 
we ever had." 
13. J.O.C. Annual Report (1979) estimated that between January 
1976 and January 1979 some 6 200 white farmers abandoned 
their farms. 
14. The standard dip fee was Z$10 per beast per annum. 
15. The previous minimum sentence for stock theft had been 
two years imprisonment. 
16. This clause and the future composition of the security forces 
were the two most controversial issues at the conference. 
17. The RF was anxious to prevent the nationalisation of private 
property. 
18. In 1981, the then Minister of Home Affairs, Edgar Tekere, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Newspapers 
The Daily News 
The Economist 
The Farmer 






The Zimbabwe Review 
Published Works 
Abel, N. and Blaikie, P. M. 1990. Land Degradation, Stocking Rates 
and Conservation Policies in the Communal Rangelands of 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. (London: ODI) 
Abraham, D. p. 1966. "The Roles of Chaminuka and the 
Mhondoro cults in Shona Political History" in Stokes. E. and 
Brown, R. eds. The Zambezian Past: Studies in Central African 
History. (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
Adas. M. 1979. Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest 
Movements against the European Colonial Order. (North 
Carolina: Chapel Hill Publications) 
Amin, N. 1991. Peasant Differentiation and Food Security in 
Zimbabwe. (Harare: UZD) 
Astrow, A. 1983. Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way. 
(London: Zed Press) 
Arrighi, G. 1970. "Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A 
Study of Proletarianisation of African Peasantry in Rhodesia". 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 6. 
Beach, D. 1984. Zimbabwe Before 1900. (Gweru: Mambo Press) 
Beach, D. 1979. "Chimurenga The Shona Rising of 1896— 1897". 
Journal of African History, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1979. 
Beinart, W. 1984. "Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about 
Development: A Southern African Exploration 1900-1960". 
JSAS,Vol. 11, 1984. 
Bonzo, F. 1996. "Zanla's Liberation War in Manica Province 1968 — 
1979". UZ History Department Hons. Dissertation, 1996. 
Brandly, P. and McNamara, K. 1991. The Role of Trees and 
Woodlands in Zimbabwe's Commercial Areas. (Stockholm: World 
was accused of organising the murder of a white farmer. In 
the controversial court case which ensued, Tekere was 
acquitted, but was dismissed from government. 
19. Between 1981 — 1987, an estimated 37 white farmers or 
family members were killed, and another 68 injured in rural 
violence in Zimbabwe. 
20. The link between domestic/social violence and rural poverty 
and over-crowding has been surprisingly under-researched. 
21. From 1990— 1999, basic food prices rose by 300 per cent. 
22. Land designation, both as law and process, was not invented 
by the ZANU-PF government. The Rhodesian government 
also designated abandoned or under-utiised white farms 
during the second Chimurenga. 
23. It has precipitated a strong exchange of views between 
Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, the World Bank and the 
IMP. 
24. The Agric-Alert system allowed farmers in hostile areas to 
use mobile walkie-talkies to communicate with each other 
and the RSE 
25. Zimbabwe has 2 281 white-owned farms listed. It is 
estimated that each commercial farm family owns at least 
one firearm (The Farmer July 27, 1998). 
26. Interview with T. Chaza (ex-ZANLA fighter and current 
member of the ZWVA), Harare, January 9, 1999. 
Books Report) 
Bratton, M. 1979. "Settler State, Guerrilla War and Rural 
Underdevelopment in Rhodesia". Rural Africana, Vol. 4—5, 
Spring-Fall, 1979. 
Bratton, M. 1993. "Ten Years After: Land Redistribution in 
Zimbabwe 1980— 1990". UZ CASS Seminar Paper. 
Bullock, C. 1928. The Mashona. (Cape Town: Juta) 
Caute, D. 1983. Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia. 
(London: Allen Lane) 
Cheater, A. P. 1982. "Effects of the Liberation War in One 
Commercial Farming Area in Zimbabwe". UZ, Sociology 
Department Seminar Paper, 1982. 
Cheater, A. P. 1984. Idioms of Accumulation: Rural Development 
and Class Formation among Free Holders in Zimbabwe. (Gweru: 
Mambo Press) 
Chater, P. 1985. Caught in the Crossfire. (Harare: ZPH) 
Chavunduka, G. et al. 1984. Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into the Agricultural Industry. (Harare: Government Printer) 
Chenje, M. 1998. State of the Environment in Zimbabwe. (Harare: 
UZ Publishers) 
Cilliers, J. 1985. Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia. (London: 
Croomhelm) 
Cilliers, J. 1996. Dismissed; Demobilisation and Reintegration of 
Former Combatants in Africa. (South Africa, IDP) 
Clarke, D. 1974. Domestic and Farm Workers in Rhodesia. (Gwelo: 
Mambo Press) 
Clegham, B. 1865. "Report on the Conditions of Grazing in the 
TTL's". Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, Vol. 63. 
CSO. 1982. Main Demographic Features of the Population in 
Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe 1982 Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
CSO. 1988. Demographic and Health Survey. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Duggan, W. 1980. "The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and 
the Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia". African 
Affairs, Vol. 79. 
Davidson, B. 1981. The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in 
Africa. (London: Longman) 
Evans, M. 1983. Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of 
Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia 1972 — 1979 (Harare: UZ 
Publications) 
Fyfe, C. and McMaster, D. eds. 1981. Africans Historical 
TRACKTWO May2000 31 
Demography Vol.2. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh) 
Flower, K. 1987. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chi ef on Record. 
(London: J. Murray) 
Gann, L. 1965. A History of Southern Rhodesia. (New York: 
Humanities Press) 
Gann, L. and Henriksen, T 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle 
in the Bush. (New York: Praeger) 
Gelfand, M. "Migration of African Labourers in Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 1890— 1914". Central African Journal of Medicine, 
Vol. 7, No. 8. 
Good, K. 1974. "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia". African Affairs, 
Vol. 73. 
Gregory, M. 1981. "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed 
Struggle and Electoral Mobiisation". Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics, March. 
Grant, P. 1981. "The Fertiisation of Sandy soils in Peasant 
Agriculture". Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, Vol. 78, No. 5. 
Hodges, T. 1977. "Counter Insurgency and the Fate of Rural 
Blacks". African Report, September/October. 
Isaacman, A. 1977. "Social Banditry in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and 
Mozambique 1984 — 1907: An Expression of Early Peasant 
Protest". JSAS, Vol. 1. 
Isaacman, A. 1977. "Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and 
Central Africa c 1850— 1920". International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1. 
Iliffe, J. 1990. Famine in Zimbabwe: 1890— 1960 (Gweru: Mambo 
Press). 
Keppel-Jones, A. 1993. Rhodes and Rhodesia: The white Conquest of 
Zimbabwe 1884— 1902. (Ontario: McGill-Queens University 
Press) 
Kirk, T. 1975. "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia". African Affairs, 
Vol. 72, No. 294. 
Kinsey, B. 1982. "Forever Gained: Resettlement and Land Policy in 
the Context of National Development in Zimbabwe". Journal of 
International African Institute, Vol. 52, No.3. 
Kriger, N. 1992. Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Keyler, C. 1978. "Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia 1931 — 
1914: The African Contribution to White Survival". Central 
African Historical Association, Vol. 34. 
Lan, D. 1985. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in 
Zimbabwe. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 
Mandaza, I. 1986. Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 
1980-1986. (Dakar, Senegal) 
Martin, D. and Johnson, P. 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The 
Chimurenga War. (Harare: ZPH) 
Makeza, T. 1995. "The Second Chimurenga in Gokwe District 1973 
— 1980". UZ History Department Hons. Dissertation. 
Means, R. ed. 1996. Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom 
of the African Environment. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Moorcraft, P. and Mclaughlin, P. 1982. Chimurenga: The War in 
Rhodesia 1965— 1980. (Johannesburg: Sygma/Collins). 
Mugoba, T. 1995. "Zanla's Liberation War in Gaza Province 1979— 
1979". UZ History Department Hons. Dissertation. 
Moyo, 5. 1987. The Land Question in Zimbabwe. (Harare: 
CODESRIA Books, Jongwe Press) 
Mudiniu, M. and Bernstein, R. eds. 1991. Household and National 
Food Security in Southern Africa. (Harare: UZ Press) 
Musemwa, M. 1996. "The Ambiguities of Democracy: The 
Demobilisation of the Zimbabwean ex-combatants and the 
Ordeal of Rehabilitation 1980 — 1993" in Cilliers, J. Dismissed: 
Demobilisation and Rehabilitation of Former Combatants in 
Africa. 
Nehwati, F. 1970. "The Social and Commercial Background of 
Zhii, the African Raids in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia in 
1960". African Affairs, Vol. 69, July. 
Nyambara, P. 1997. "A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe 
District of North-West Zimbabwe c 1945 — 1999". Paper 
Presented at Economic History Seminar Conference, 1997. 
Palmer, R. 1977. Land and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia. 
(Berkeley: University California Press) 
Palmer, R. and Parson, N. eds. 1977. The Roots of Rural Poverty in 
Central and Southern Africa. (London: Heinemann) 
Phimister, 1. 1977 "Peasant Production and Underdevelopment in 
Southern Rhodesia 1890-1914" in R. Palmer and Parson. N. eds. 
The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. 
Raftopolous, B. 1997. "The State, Politics and The Independence 
Process in Zimbabwe: Class Formation Behind Closed Doors 
1990 — 1996." Paper Presented at Economic History Seminar 
Conference, 1997. 
Ranger, T. 1967. Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896— 1897. 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press) 
Ranger, T. 1975. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in 
Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study. (Berkeley: University 
California Press) 
Ranger, T. 1986. "Bandits and Guenillas : The Case of Zimbabwe" 
in Crummey, J. ed. Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in 
Africa. (London: J. Currey) 
Reid-Daly, R. 1982. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War. (Alberton: 
Galago Publishing) 
Riddell, R. 1980. The Land Question: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. 
(London: Catholic Institute for International Relations) 
SADCC. 1986. Involving the People in Soil and Water Conservation: 
The Mwenezi Experience: A Case Study. (Harare: SADCC) 
Sandford, 5. 1982. Livestock in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe 
Report prepared for Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rural 
Development. (Harare: Government of Zimbabwe Publishing) 
Sibanda, P. 1993. "The Secret War in Matebeleland: 1981 — 1987". 
(UZ History Department, Seminar Paper, 1993) 
Sithole, M. 1978. Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle. 
(Salisbury: Rujeko) 
Stromm, J. 1988. Zimbabwe's Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
Weinrich, K. 1977. "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia". JSAS, Vol. 
3, No. 3. 
Weinmann, J. 1996. Zimbabwe's : Land Crisis: A Reassessment 
(Berkeley, University of California Press) 
Watts, M. 1985. Silent Violence: Food Famine and Peasantry in 
Northern Nigeria. (Berkeley: University of California Press) 
Whitlow, R. 1980. "Environmental Constraints of Population 
Pressure in the Tribal Areas of Zimbabwe". Zimbabwe 
Agricultural Journal, Vol. 81, No. 2. 
Zimbabwe Government. 1982. Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1986. Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1989. Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1992. Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1996. Population Census. (Harare: 
Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1987. Cattle Census in Communal Lands. 
(Harare: Government Printer) 
Zimbabwe Government. 1986. First Five Year Development Plan 
1986 — 1990. (Harare: Government Printer) 
32 TRACK TWO May 2000 
A young boy watches the 1995 national elections 
About the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 15 an independent 
institute associated with the University 
of Cape Town. It is based in the 
Western Cape and works nationally to 
fulfil its mission: 
The Centre for Conflict Resolution 
seeks to contribute towards a just 
peace in Mrica by promoting 
constructive, creative and cooperative 
approaches to the resolution of 
conflict and the reduction of violence. 
The Centre's activities fall into four 
main areas: • Mediation and facilitation as a third 
party in a conflict, and advice on 
how parties themselves might handle 
their conflicts. • Training third parties and those 
directly involved in conflict to build 
their mediation, negotiation and 
conflict handling skills. • Education through publications, 
talks and workshops to promote 
non- violent, non-adversarial 
approaches to conifict. • Research, focused primarily on non- 
adversarial approaches to conflict 
and strategic planning, and on the 
transformation of security policy 
and security institutions. 
In the Centre's Resource Centre, 
there are 5 000 articles, papers and 
books on conflict and peace studies, 
and our librarian can provide comput- 
erised bibliographies on any topic 
within the field. 
Funds are raised independently from 
a variety of sources to support the 
Centre's projects. 
CCR's contact details: 
tel. (27) 21-4222512, 
fax (27) 2 1-4222622 
email: mailbox@ccr.uct.ac.za 
or write to do UCT, Private Bag, 
Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa. 
